

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BELGRA 01304 01 OF 02 270853Z

11

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-11 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

ACDA-05 TRSE-00 OMB-01 ERDA-05 SAM-01 SAJ-01 /083 W

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R 261500Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5753

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BERN

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SFOAIA

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

AMEMBASSY VALLETTA

US MISSION BERLIN

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

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PAGE 02 BELGRA 01304 01 OF 02 270853Z

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 1304

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CSCE, YO
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION

REF : STATE 29999

1. SUMMARY: IN FEBRUARY 24 CALL ON FSFA COUNSELOR MIHAJLO LOMPAR, POL COUNS MADE POINTS OUTLINED IN REFTEL. LOMPAR ADDED SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF CSCE IMPE-
MENTATION TO THOSE ON OUR LIST AND MADE CLEAR YUGOSLAVS SEE CSCE IN BROADER CONTEXT THAN DOES U.S. HE ALSO DISCUSSED YUGOSLAV PREPARATIONS FOR 1977 BELGRADE CONFERENCE. POL COUNS RAISED AND PROTESTED CRITICISM OF U.S. IN AN ARTICLE BY DEPUTY SECRETARY MOJSOV ON CSCE -- THE FIRST BUT CERTAINLY NOT THE LAST DIFFERENCE WE WILL HAVE WITH NEXT YEAR'S HOSTS AS PUR COMMENT ON YUGOSLAVIA'S MAJOR OBJECTIVES SUGGESTS. END SUMMARY.

2. CSCE IMPLEMENTATION: IN RESPONSE TO PRESENTATION PER REFTEL, LOMPAR STATED GOY AGREES WITH U.S. POSITION THAT EFFECTIVENESS OF CSCE IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD BE JUDGED BY MANNER IN WHICH SIGNATORIES HONORED SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF FINAL DOCUMENT, BUT HE ALSO MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT YUGOSLAVS SAW CSCE AND IMPLEMENTATION IN MUCH BROADER CONTEXT THAN WE DO--AS "DYNAMIC PROCESS". LOMPAR CITED TRIESTE BORDER SETTLEMENT, YUGOSLAV SOUTHERN MACEDONIA MANEUVER NOTIFICATION, PUBLICATION OF FINAL DOCUMENT IN ALL OFFICIAL YUGOSLAV LANGUAGES, AND BALKAN CONFERENCE. HE ALSO CITED MBFR AND POLISH PROPOSAL FOR CEMA-EC TALKS BUT SAID BOTH WERE TOO RESTRICTED.

3. BELGRADE 77: IN PREPARATION FOR THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING NEXT YEAR, LOMPAR STATED THAT THE YUGOSLAVS
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 BELGRA 01304 01 OF 02 270853Z

HAVE ESTABLISHED TWO GROUPS AND WILL SOON ADD A THIRD. WITHIN FSFA AMBASSADOR MILORAD PESIC, RECENTLY YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION, HAS BEEN PLACED IN CHARGE WITH A WORKING GROUP UNDER STEVAN SOC TO ASSIST HIM. (LOMPAR, WHO WAS PREVIOUSLY HEAD OF CSCE GROUP, WILL APPARENTLY WORK UNDER SOC NOW THAT THE WHOLE EFFORT IS BEING UPGRADED.) TO COORDINATE TOTAL GOY EFFORTS, AN INTER-AGENCY COMMISSION ("INTERRESORNA

KOMISIJA" -- LITERALLY INTEREST COMMISSION) HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN SECRETARY MOJSOV AS CHAIRMAN AND PESIC DOING THE REAL WORK. A THIRD COMMITTEE DEALING WITH ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS AND BRINGING TOGETHER REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CITY GOVERNMENT WITH FSFA HAS YET TO GET UNDERWAY, BUT LOMPAR STRESSED THE GOY AWARE THAT WITH JUST 18 MONTHS TO GO IT IS NON TOO SOON TO BEGIN ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES (WE MIGHT ADD PARTICULARLY HERE IN THE BALKANS).

4. LOMPAR SAID IT TOO SOON TO TELL WHAT LENGTH AND SUBSTANCE OF FOLLOW-UP MEETING WILL BE. GOY BELIEVES MUCH WILL DEPEND ON CONSULTATIONS IN INTERVENING PERIOD. GOY PLANS EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS BUT THESE HAVE ONLY JUST STARTED. FINNISH DELEGATION ARRIVING NEXT MONTH TO SHARE THEIR ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE (FINNISH AMBASSADOR IN GENEVA RESPONSIBLE FOR DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY, ALONG WITH BOTH HEAD OF POLITICAL DEPARTMENT AND CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE TYPE OF FOREIGN MINISTRY). THEY HAVE MET WITH AUSTRIANS AND SOVIETS (MINIC RAISED WITH GROMYKO IN MOSCOW) AND PLAN TO SEE OTHER PARTICIPANTS SOON. LOMPAR SAID GOY WOULD WELCOME FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH U.S., BOTH HERE AND IN WASHINGTON. AT SAME TIME HE STRESSED THAT JUST BECAUSE CONFERENCE WAS BEING HELD IN BELGRADE YUGOSLAVS GIVEN NO RIGHT TO HAVE "PRETENSIONS TO LEADERSHIP".

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 BELGRA 01304 02 OF 02 270903Z

12
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PAGE 02 BELGRA 01304 02 OF 02 270903Z

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BELGRADE 1304

4. MOJSOV ARTICLE: CALL ENDED ON RATHER SOUR NOTE
OVER DEPUTY SECRETARY MOJSOV'S CSCE ARTICLE, PUBLISHED
IN THREE SECTIONS IN FEBRUARY 18-20 BORBA (COPIES
OF TRANSLATION POUCHED TO EUR/EE, EUR/RPM AND USNATO).
POLITICAL COUNSELOR RAISED ARTICLE TO PROTEST FACT
MOJSOV SINGLED OUT ONLY ONE COUNTRY FOR CRITICISM BY
NAME -- THE UNITED STATES (SOME OF HIS CRITICISM IS
DIRECTED AT THE EAST BUT HE DOES NOT CITE THE SOVIET
UNION BY NAME). SENTENCE IN QUESTION READS "IN SPITE
OF THIS PREDOMINATION ORIENTATION TOWARDS SUCH A LONG-
TERM PROCESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE, A PROCESS WHICH,
THROUGH A STRENGTHENING OF MUTUAL SECURITIY AND AN
EXPANSION OF COOPERATION IN ALL SPHERES, PASSING
BEYOND EXISTING FRONTIERS AND BLOC BARRIERS, WOULD
LEAD TOWARDS A GRADUAL SURMOUNTING OF PRESENT-DAY

PARTITIONS, AND WOULD ESSENTIALLY CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LASTING PEACE IN EUROPE AND AROUND IT, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE, IN CERTAIN CIRCLES IN EUROPE AND ESPECIALLY IN THE THE UNITED STATES, THERE APPEARED CERTAIN OTHER TENDENCIES WHICH, WE HOPE, ARE OF SHORT-TERM CHARACTER, AND ARE MAINLY CONNECTED WITH TACTICAL MOVES OF ADJUSTMENTS TO THE NEWLY-CREATED CONDITIONS AND WITH NARROW-MINDED CONCEPTS OF MAKING MOMENTARY USE OF VARIOUS MINOR ADVANTAGES IN RELATION TO CERTAIN PARTNERS" (PARTNERS HERE ACTUALLY MEANS ADVERSARIES). POL COUNS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT MOJSOV WOULD SINGLE OUT THE UNITED STATES FOR CRITICISM CALLING THIS "ONE-SIDED" AND "SURPRISING IN VIEW OF HOST'S SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OBJECTIVITY". HE ASID THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WAS OF COURSE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES. AT THE SAME TIME HE STRESSED U.S. HOPE TO COOPERATE WITH THE YUGOSLAVS IN THE TASK AHEAD. LOMPAR SEEMED DISCOMFITED BY THESE REMARKS, CLAIMED THAT HE HAD NOT YET READ

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 BELGRA 01304 02 OF 02 270903Z

THE ARTICLE AND THUS COULD NOT COMMENT, URGED US TO TAKE MOJSOV'S LINE AS THAT OF AN "INDIVIDUAL", EVEN THOUGH MOJSOV HEADS THE YUGOSLAV CSCE IMPLEMENTATION EFFORT AND LOMPAR HIMSELF HAD ADVISED POL COUNS SEVERAL WEEKS AGO THAT A FORTHCOMING ARTICLE BY MOJSOV WOULD BE COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF GOY VIEWS. LOMPAR PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER FOR US.

5. COMMENT: WHILE MOJSOV'S CRITICISM OF THE UNITED STATES IS IRRITATING, THE YUGOSLAV CAMPAIGN TO BROADEN AND REFOCUS CSCE, WHICH HIS ARTICLE AND OUR CONSULTATIONS FORESHADOW, IS OF GREATER LONG-TERM CONCERN--FOR THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS THE UNITED STATES. THE YUGOSLAVS ARE NATURALLY OUT TO USE THEIR NEW PROMINENCE IN CSCE FOR THEIR OWN ENDS-- TO ENHANCE THEIR INFLUENCE AND SECURITY WITHIN EUROPE AND TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED.

6. TO ACHIEVE THE FIRST OF THESE TWO GOALS THE YUGOSLAVS WILL STRIVE TO CONCERT THE EFFORTS OF EUROPE'S SMALLER NATIONS TO EXPAND THEIR ROLE. THEY ARE ALARMED BY WHAT MOJSOV TERMS THE "RETROGRADE TENDENCY IN THE POST-HELSINKI PERIOD TO STRENGTHEN THE COHESION, FORCED COMACTNESS AND DISCIPLINE WITHIN INDIVIDUAL BLOCKS AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC GROUPS, WITH THE OBVIOUS OBJECT OF NOT ONLY PRESERVING THESE GROUPS BUT ALSO STRENGTHENING THEM (HERE THE YUGOSLAVS ARE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR EAST THAN TO THEIR WEST). THIS TENDENCY IS OF COURSE CLOSELY

CONNECTED WITH A CONCEPT THAT THE WHOLE DIPLOMATIC-NEGOTIATING OPERATION WHICH HAD LED TO THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE ONLY REPRESENTED AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BLOCS, AND THAT THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI CONCLUSIONS SHOULD BE VIEWED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF NARROW-MINDED INTEREST OF THE BLOCS." WHERE THIS APPROACH LEADS IS CLEAR. THUS FOR EXAMPLE IN DISCUSSING WHAT STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT CSCE MOJSOV ASSERTS THAT AS "ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND NOT JUST THOSE WHICH ARE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY BLOCS, ARE INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING AT LONG LAST SOME TANGIBLE RESULTS IN THE (MBFR) NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BELGRA 01304 02 OF 02 270903Z

GOING ON FOR YEARS IN VIENNA WITHOUT MAKING ANY MAJOR PROGRESS ... ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD TAKE PART IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER, OR SHOULD AT LEAST HAVE SOME INSIGHT INTO THEM AND SOME INFLUENCE ON THEIR COURSE."

7. TO ACHIEVE THEIR SECOND OBJECTIVE--ADVANCING THEIR LEADERSHIP AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED--THE YUGOSLAVS WILL TRY TO REFOCUS CSCE ON THE LINK BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE THIRD WORLD. MJOSOV BEGAN THE PROCESS WITH A VENGEANCE, STATING NOT ONLY THAT YUGOSLAVIA ATTACHED "EXTRAORDINARY IMPORTANCE" TO THIS ISSUE BUT MAKING IT APPEAR THAT THE HELSINKI DOCUMENT ITSELF HAD DEVOTED MAJOR ATTENTION TO IT AND COMMENTING THAT "HELSINKI OF 1975 AND COLOMBO OF 1976 CAN AND SHOULD BECOME THE CORNERSTONES OF A NEW SYSTEM OF INTER-EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS". HE OBVIOUSLY WISHES TO IMPLY THAT BELGRADE OF 1977 SHOULD BE THE SYNTHESIS OF BOTH.

8. WE ARE OFF AND RUNNING ON THE NEXT LAP OF CSCE WITH A THIRD CONTENDER NOW CLEARLY DETERMINED NOT TO BE OVERSHADOWED BY THE TWO MAJOR ENTRANTS FROM THE EAST AND THE WEST. SWEITZER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TREATY COMPLIANCE, NONALIGNED NATIONS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 FEB 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CollinP0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976BELGRA01304
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760074-0139
From: BELGRADE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760212/aaaaajlg.tel
Line Count: 319
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 76 STATE 29999
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CollinP0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 MAR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <31 MAR 2004 by ElyME>; RELEASED <31 MAR 2004 by CollinP0>; APPROVED <31 MAR 2004 by CollinP0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONSULTATIONS ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION
TAGS: PFOR, YO, CSCE
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006